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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DALE KURT ROTHE,
Category 14b

Defendant-Appellant,
vs.
JODY ROTHE,

Appeals No.:

880018-CA

Plaintiff-Respondent.
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

COMES NOW Appellant in the above-entitled matter and
replies to Respondent's Brief pursuant to Rule 24 (c) of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
NEW MATTERS SET FORTH
IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
1.

Plaintiff-respondent

Jody

Rothe

asserts

that

defendant-appellant Dale Rothe lacks standing to bring this
appeal because, pursuant to the divorce decree, he signed over
a quit-claim deed to the residence in question, thereby
"eliminating" his interest therein. (Respondent's Brief,

page 3 ) .
2.

Plaintiff asserts that parol evidence regarding the

intent of the parties when the decree of divorce was signed
should not be allowed because of the "clear and unambiguous
language" of the decree. (Respondent's Brief, Page 4 ) .
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT DALE ROTHE HAS A PRESENT, SUBSTANTIAL
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT CAUSE OF ACTION,,
Plaintiff

believes defendant has no standing because

he signed over a quit-claim deed to the home in question to
plaintiff.

Of course, defendant only did that after the

divorce decree was signed creating the obligation of plaintiff
to make the mortgage payments and after plaintiff had indeed
made 10 payments towards that mortgage through a deduction
made by defendant in alimony owed to her. (R. 226). To now
allege, several years later, when legal imperfections in the
loan documents present a question regarding the validity of
the mortgage, that defendant's actions in signing the deed
eliminates his interest concerning the intent of the divorce
decree is ludicrous for several reasons.
First, just because defendant arguably can no longer
receive the benefits of the premises, does not mean he is
immune from the obligation associated with it.

There is no

dispute that he signed the document obligating himself to the
2

payments on the house. Should it b e determined that plaintiff
not b e responsible for those payments, t h e obligation remains
Thei: e i s obvi ous 11 y a l'persona 1 stake in

for t h e defendant.

the outcome of the controversy as to warrant ,
59 Am. J ur

of t.he Court's jurisdiction."

Invocation

2d, Parties

Sec.

31.
Second, plaintiff maintains that, even though defendant
is obli gated for the pay ments, h I s parents ;«rI ] 1 never make him
pay, and therefore eliminates h i s interest.

Obviously, an

interest sufficient to invoke standing by t h e court must b e
based on legal rights and obligations and n o t hearsay beliefs
on whether o r n o t such legal rights will b e enforced.
fact

The

ot t ho m.itfpr is that, in .i separate cause of action

currently

in the Fourth District Court, defendant h a s been

sued on the document b

h i s parents,

and Third-Party Compla.
judgment

against

foreclosure

of

, F ::>i i K

defendant
the

In their Counterclaim

ai n :i Am} I t

for back

premises

for

Rothe L: I. : jr

payments
default,

not made,
and

for

indemnification should they b e held liable for filing a notice
of interest against the home in question,

Again, defendant

c l e a r l y h \'- in nterest :i n f'he out r:op"p of Hi i s ippeal.
Finally, it must b e remembered h<>w this appeal occurred.
This

issue

is only

o n e of many

3

concerning

t h e proper

interpretation
the parties•
decree.

and enforcement of a divorce decree between
Certainly defendant has an interest in that

Indeed, the only reason defendant signed over the

quit-claim deed to plaintiff was pursuant to that decree.
Should the decree need to be modified, it might well need to
have the deed rescinded in order to work justice and equity
between the parties and the dissolution of their marriage.
The

above

analysis

clearly

fulfills

the

test

for

standing, as quoted in plaintiff's brief, from the case of
Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands and Forestry, 716 P.2d
796 (Utah 1986).

In Terracor the court went into detail to

explain the purpose of standing in Utah:
Unlike federal law where standing doctrine is related to
the"case or controversy" language of Article III of the
United States Constitution, our standing law arises from
the general precepts of the doctrine of separation of
powers found in Article V of the Utah Constitution.
Terracor at 798.

There is obviously no worry of encroaching

upon other branches of government with the issues involved in
this appeal.

The court then continues to set out three

general standards to determine whether or not a litigant has
standing. If the first criterion is met, the other two do not
apply.

That first criterion is that there is "some distinct

and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the
outcome of the legal dispute." Terracor at 799. As explained

4

above, defendant is clearly liable for the payment of the
mortgage and is currently being sued for those payments. This
appeal

win, 1 I, determine whether

rightfully

due

from plaintiff.

or

not: iliose payments are

11

is a direct, real,

financial stake in the outcome of this proceeding.
The second criterion, i f the fI i :st is not found t o t e
adequate, is that standing will be allowed if no one has
greater :i i iterest i n the 01 itcome of the case and the issues are
unlikely to be raised at all unless defendant raises them. Id.
Clearly defendant's parents need not bring this cause of
action for they already have defendant 1 i abl e on the mortgage.
The only other way this issue could come up on appeal would
be

defendant's

third-party

indemnification

against plaintiff in the other lawsuit.
identical.

claim

The issue would be

The harm to defendant identical.

It is only

natural l/hcil" defendant t:v( 1 he proper party to bring the issue
on appeal.
Pursuant

to Utah

case

law

the

facts

of

this

case

clearly show that defendant has standing in this appeal.
Defendant

respectfully

requests

this

court

to

find

the

necessary standing and to determine the issues on their merits

5

according to the briefs submitted.
DATED this ^ /

day of December, 1988,
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Wayne/6-/ Watson,P.C.
Atto^n^y for Defendant-Appellant
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